This paper shall make an attempt to critically reflect on the conceptualization of emotions in the Indian Philosophical systems. To bring out the insight, the paper is divided into three main sections. The first section of the paper entitled ‘The Body-Emotions-Mind Complex and the Question of Self: Understanding the Dualistic Tradition’ will make an analysis of emotions and the mind-body complex vis-à-vis the question of self or consciousness in Indian Philosophy with special reference to the study of Advaita Vedānta and (...) the philosophical position of Upaniṣadic teachings. It will also incorporate the Nyāya account of emotions in the Indian philosophical system. The second section of the paper is entitled as ‘Triguṇa and the Emotional Experience: A Perspective in Sāṃkhya Philosophy’. It will reflect on the systematic presentation of Sāṃkhya philosophical system on account of its relation between the two ontological realities — puruṣa and prakṛti. It is this prakṛti which is constituted of the three guṇas — sattva, rajas and tamas; and therefore is the embodied self having its association with emotions. The third section of the paper entitled ‘Understanding Religious Emotions: Towards a Positive Representation of Emotions in Indian Philosophy’ will make an attempt to critically reflect on the necessary shift required in conceptualizing emotions in the Indian Philosophical systems. That is to say, from a negative connotation of emotions to a more significant positive account of emotions in human-spiritual life. This necessary shift will be directed towards the understanding of Religious Emotions — faith and devotion which can serve as a guiding principle to justify the soteriological approach of Indian Philosophy, i.e. towards pure consciousness. Thereby the paper shall explore the consideration of the relevance of emotions in the Indian Philosophical System. (shrink)

This article examines how efforts at legal legibility acquisition by gender diverse litigants result in problematic (e.g., narratives counter to self-identity) and, at times, erroneous discourses on sex and gender that homogenize the litigants themselves. When gender diverse persons approach the court with a rights claim, the narrative they present must necessarily limit itself to a normative discourse that the court may understand and, therefore, engage with. Consequently, the everyday lived experiences of gender diverse persons are often deliberately erased from (...) the narrative as litigants mould themselves into the pre-existing normative legal categories of gender and sex. As a result of such mechanisms, the article finds that gender diverse litigants face epistemic injustice in the courts as their legal legibility is constructed within a constraining gender binary paradigm of judicial discourse. The article explores the trajectory of transgender rights in India, through an analysis of case law prior to and post the landmark NALSA decision, to understand how the approach to transgender rights and identities has been shaped by and shapes, in turn, normative conceptions of gender. The article argues for the incorporation of temporal pluralism into the law that would allow courts to hear gender diverse litigant accounts premised on contemporary gender diversity beyond the binary (rather than incontestable prior understandings based in past precedent), which would better account for such social injustices. (shrink)

This paper discusses a central idea of our everyday life—human actions and the role of luck in the moral life. The aim of this paper is to formulate and discuss the problem of moral luck, thereby dealing with the question: ‘what is the status or role of luck in the moral life of an individual?’ Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel highlight the juxtaposition of the two contradictory terms: ‘Luck’ and ‘Morality’ and used the term ‘moral luck’ which inculcates the view (...) that the factor of luck or fortune can affect the moral worth of an individual. In this context, the paper is specifically concerned with the philosophical problem of moral luck which raises a conceptual tension between morality and responsibility by emphasizing that moral assessment, evaluation and justification of human actions are all subjected to luck. Further, in the light of this philosophical problem, the paper also attempts to postulate a possible moral framework with an aim to analyse and conceptually map the status of the juxtaposition of luck and morality. (shrink)

Background The world is urbanizing rapidly; more than half the world’s population now lives in urban areas, leading to significant transition in lifestyles and social behaviours globally. While offering many advantages, urban environments also concentrate health risks and introduce health hazards for the poor. In Bangladesh, although many public policies are directed towards equity and protecting people’s rights, these are not comprehensively and inclusively applied in ways that prioritize the health rights of citizens. The country is thus facing many issues (...) that raise moral and ethical concerns. Methods A narrative literature review was conducted between October 2016 and November 2017 on issues related to social justice, health, and human rights in urban Bangladesh. The key questions discussed here are: i) ethical dilemmas and inclusion of the urban poor to pursue social justice; and ii) the ethical obligations and moral responsibilities of the state and non-state sectors in serving Bangladesh’s urban poor. Using a Rawlsian theory of equality of opportunity to ensure social justice, we identified key health-related ethical issues in the country’s rapidly changing urban landscape, especially among the poor. Results We examined ethical dilemmas in Bangladesh’s health system through the rural–urban divide and the lack of coordination among implementing agencies. The unregulated profusion of the private sector and immoral practices of service providers result in high out-of-pocket expenditures for urban poor, leading to debt and further impoverishment. We also highlight policy and programmatic gaps, as well as entry points for safeguarding the right to health for Bangladeshi citizens. Conclusions The urban health system in Bangladesh needs a reform in which state and non-state actors should work together, understanding and acknowledging their moral responsibilities for improving the health of the urban poor by engaging multiple sectors. The social determinants of health should be taken into account when formulating policies and programs to achieve universal health coverage and ensure social justice for the urban poor in Bangladesh. (shrink)

Classical commentary, with a supercommentary, on Jaimini's Mīmāṃsāsūtra, presenting the tradition of Bhāṭṭa school; includes Mīmāṃsāśāstrasāraḥ, by N.S. Anantakrishna Sastri.

Commentary on the philosophical poems by Narayana Guru, 1856-1928, philosopher-saint; includes text.

The ninth volume contains ahnikas, divisions, forty-two to forty-seven, and the tenth volume contains ahnikas forty-eight to fifty-six. Each Panini sutra is followed by the relevant bhashya, commentary, and the varttika, annotation, of Vararuchi. Each volume has indexes of the sutras, varttikas, nyayas, paribhashas, and important Sanskrit and English words.

Comparing the _kāraka_ theory as presented in Pāṇiniʼs (_ca_. fifth-fourth century BC) and Candragominʼs (_ca_. fifth century AD) systems of grammar, Joshi and Roodbergen observed that in the _Cāndrasūtra_, the heading rule Pāṇ 2.3.1 (_anabhihite_), which plays an important role for all the _kāraka_ rules, is missing. Deshpande, however, criticized their understanding. According to him, Patañjali (_ca_. second century BC), in his _Mahābhāṣya_, already dealt with the question of whether the general principle _uktārthānām aprayogaḥ_ can justify the omission of this (...) heading rule; under the influence of Patañjali, Candragomin took the position that it is not necessary to explicitly provide Pāṇ 2.3.1. The present paper revisits this issue on the basis of some newly edited Cāndra materials, the _Cāndrapañjikā_ and the _Śabdārthacintā_, which were both written by the eminent Sinhalese grammarian Ratnamati or Ratnaśrījñāna (_ca_. tenth century AD). Ratna’s detailed explanation not only confirms that Deshpande’s assumption is correct, but it also clarifies that the problem pointed out by Pāṇinians in the case of the omission of Pāṇ 2.3.1 can be solved by resorting to the theory of the fivefold meaning of a nominal stem. (shrink)

In this article, I propose to analyse the earliest Indian systematic discussion on the problem of meaning and denotation of words. The discussion itself seems to have been conceived within the famous Indian grammatical tradition (vyākaraṇa), and its definitive form was given by the Grammarian Patañjali (second century BC) in his work Mahābhāṣya. This whole discussion is carried over and further developed within classical Indian philosophy, beginning with the Nyāya school, whose positions regarding semantics are also analysed here, based on (...) classical works of this school. (shrink)

According to the poetician Vāmana, a genitive ending can denote not only a direct relation but also an indirect relation. For example, in kamalasya kandaḥ ‘the bulb of the lotus flower’ the genitive ending Ṅas introduced after the word kamala denotes the indirect relation between the lotus flower and the bulb, the relation established through the intermediary of the lotus plant that has a direct relation with both of them. Is such a view acceptable to Pāṇinian grammarians? Careful scrutiny of (...) Patañjali’s discussions in the Mahābhāṣya concerning what the affix matUP signifies reveals that he does not accept that a genitive ending occurs to denote an indirect relation: he considers that Aṣṭādhyāyī 2.3.50: ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe, which provides for introducing a genitive ending, has for its domain a direct relation alone. For Vāmana, on the other hand, the poetic expression kamalasya kandaḥ and the like serve to testify to the fact that a genitive ending can be used to signify an indirect relation. What is important is that Aṣṭādhyāyī 2.3.50 as it stands does not exclude this. Just as Patañjali accepts a direct relation as the domain of Aṣṭādhyāyī 2.3.50 on the basis of the usage of model speakers, so does Vāmana accept an indirect relation as its further domain on the basis of the usage of great poets. (shrink)

In Tarkasaṁgraha (TS), Annaṁbhaṭṭa defines inferential cognition (anumiti) as that cognition which results from parāmarśa. In his own commentary on TS, namely Tarkasaṁgraha-dīpikā (TSD), Annaṁbhaṭṭa shows an over-coverage of the TS definition of anumiti in ‘perception after doubt.’ And then in TSD, he moves on to remove the over-coverage by qualifying the definition (of anumiti) with pakṣatā. In this article, we will raise an objection against the strategy Annaṁbhaṭṭa chooses to remove the above-mentioned over-coverage. We will argue that qualifying the (...) definition (of anumiti) with pakṣatā does not remove the over-coverage in question. Following that an alleged solution to the over-coverage will be presented, and subsequently, we will show why the alleged solution is also flawed. Next, we will return again to defend Annaṁbhaṭṭa’s strategy of eliminating the over-coverage. Despite the defense, eventually, it will be suggested that qualifying the definition of anumiti with pakṣatā does not remove the over-coverage. Hopefully, this article will bring to light one controversial aspect of the definition of anumiti (as rendered in TS and TSD) which perhaps remains unnoticed. (shrink)

Linguistic convention is one of the central notions of Indian philosophy of language. The well-known view of samaya/saṃketa is its conception as the agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. However, in Indian philosophy of language, we also encounter two other important but little-researched interpretations of samaya/saṃketa, which consider it as the established usage of words. I present a new classification of traditions of Indian thought based on their view of linguistic convention. This classification is to (...) be verified and expanded in further studies. As far as I know, such a classification has never been undertaken before. 1) Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, and later classical Yoga of the Tattvavaiśāradī accept samaya/saṃketa as an agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. 2) Bhartṛhari the Grammarian and the continuators of his thought acknowledge samaya/saṃketa as the established usage of words that is rooted in the natural relationship between words and their meanings; the convention manifests the relationship. This view was probably also shared by Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins. 3) Classical Yoga of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya and probably also earlier Grammar thought of the Mahābhāṣya accept linguistic convention as the established usage of words, but this usage, though having neither a beginning nor an end, is not based on any natural and necessary word–meaning relationship. In this view, linguistic convention not only manifests the word–meaning relationship but also keeps it in existence. Another new contribution of this research is my explanation for why the same Sanskrit term samaya/saṃketa was applied to the different ways of understanding linguistic convention. I explain this through the common aspects of all three kinds of samaya/saṃketa. The first aspect is the content of all these kinds of samaya/saṃketa. Irrespective of how linguistic convention is understood, its content is the same: “such and such a word has such and such a meaning”. The second aspect is the crucial role of linguistic convention in language acquisition, communication, and transmission. (shrink)

Examining the function and style of the references to grammatical literature found in a substantial section of Helārāja’s Prakīrṇaprakāśa on Bhartṛhari’s third book of the Vākyapadīya, the article argues that the likely ideological motive of this commentary was to establish its mūla work firmly within the Brahmanical canon and should therefore be seen in the context of the appropriation of Bhartṛhari’s ideas on the part of the roughly contemporary Pratyabhijñā philosophers of Kashmir. Incidentally, it also touches upon the making of (...) the Pāṇinian tradition and the relation between Helārāja and Kaiyaṭa, the Kashmiri commentator of Mahābhāṣya. (shrink)